Power laws are found in a wide range of di erent systems: from sand piles to word occurrence frequencies and to the size distribution of cities. The natural emergence of these power laws in so many di erent systems, which has been called self organized criticality, seems rather mysterious and awaits a rigorous explanation. In this letter we study the stationary regime of a previously introduced dynamical microscopic model of the stock market. We nd scaling in the economic parameters of the system. We are able to explain this phenomenon by simple general considerations. We suggest that similar considerations may explain self organized criticality in many other systems.
Introduction
The appearance of power laws in a multitude of diverse systems seems a puzzle. Bak et al [1] [2] [3] [4] ] who coined the term "self organized criticality" and discovered this phenomena in many systems suggest that many complex systems have a natural tendency to converge to a statistically stable state which can not be characterized by a speci c scale. Scaling has been recently found in the behavior of economic systems 5]. The mechanisms driving systems into the state of criticality remain rather unclear. There have been recent attempts to explain self organized criticality via the renormalization group approach [6] [7] [8] . It is not yet certain how far this approach can be stretched in order to apply for a large class of generic complex systems.
In the present work we study a simple microscopic model of the stock market 9, 10] .
In the present letter we report the emergence (in the time-stationary regime) of power laws in the distribution of wealth among the investors represented in the model. The time evolution of the system consist then in a superposition of random walks with steps proportional to the various investor wealthes and leads to market uctuations consistent with the experimentally found Levy distribution 5].
We o er a general explanation for the emergence of a power law in this context. Our explanation is related to the fact that investors tend to gain or lose wealth in quantities which are proportional to the wealth they have (rather than absolute quantities). We suggest that similar reasoning may o er an explanation for the spontaneous emergence of criticality in many other complex systems.
The Model
Since the point that we are trying to make does not depend on the details of the microscopic model, and for the sake of brevity we describe only the main features of the model which are relevant to our present argument. A detailed description of the model can be found elsewhere 9,10].
The microscopic`elements' of the model are N = 10 n individual investors. In this model investors must divide their money between two investment options: a riskless bond and a risky stock. Investors interact via the buying and selling of the stock and bond. Investors employ historical data regarding the performance of the stock in order to estimate the future stock performance. Each investor is characterized by a "memory span", which determines how far back into the past the investor looks. The two main aspects of the model which lead to the convergence of the wealth distribution into a power law are: a) Investors make decisions regarding the proportions of their investment in the stock and the bond. They therefore tend to gain or lose wealth in quantities which are proportional to the wealth they have (rather than absolute quantities). b) The investors' wealth does not in uence their decisions regarding investment proportions. Thus, the probabilities for gaining or losing a certain proportion of the wealth do not depend on the wealth itself. We study two versions of the basic model: 1. Unbounded Poverty -there is no limit to how poor investors can get (investors always have positive amount of money because they are not allowed to borrow, however, this positive amount can be arbitrarily close to zero). 2. Bounded Poverty -investors' wealth can not be smaller than a certain positive threshold. If they loose too much they are subsidized. More precisely: as soon as an investor's wealth decreases to less than a fraction P = 10 ?k of the current total wealth in the system, his/her wealth is increased and brought back to P .
When the parameters of the model (interest rate, dividend growth rate, etc. ) are chosen realistically the resulting stock price dynamics are very realistic 9] . In what follows we do not deal with the price dynamics but rather we concentrate only on the distribution of wealth among investors. Figure 1 shows the number of investors (up to a normalization factor) holding di erent proportions of the total wealth in a market with unbounded poverty. The measurement is averaged over 35 runs after 100,000
trading rounds (when the distribution has reached a steady state). The number of investors in the market is N = 1; 000 and they all have a memory span of 10 periods. As can be seen, the wealth distribution is very well tted by a power law with an exponent of -1.0 (slope ?1:005 0:005).
Figure 2 presents a measurement with the same parameters as the one for Figure 1 except the poverty was bounded to P = 10 ?6 of the current total wealth. Note that the power law is veri ed again for the entire range of wealths (the exponent was this time ?1:344 0:004).
Let us see how the data in gures 1 and 2 which were obtained as a result of long runs of the rather complex stochastic dynamics of the model in 9,10] can be explained by rather simple general considerations.
Emergence of Power Law
In order to give rst an intuitive sketch of the explanation assume that each investor has a probability of 50% to double his/her wealth at every time period and a probability of 50% of halving his/her wealth. In this case the wealth of each investor can be described by a random walk on the ln W axis and the density function will develop according to the di usion equation. In the absence of limiting boundary conditions (the unbounded poverty case), and after a su ciently long time the density in any xed interval of ln W will converge to uniformity. A uniform density function (ln W ) on the ln W axis translates to a power law density distribution (W) with exponent 1.0 :
In more general circumstances, one can look for the limit distribution by studying a master equation which describes e ectively in average the behaviour of the microscopic model.
The variation in time of the distribution is dominated by 2 factors: -The di usion process of the type above with a general di usion coecient .
For the reasons explained above, we assume that in our system 9,10] (and for a large class of systems) the coe cient is independent of ln W for values which are not too close to the lower cut-o W = 10 ?k and to the upper cut-o W = 1 (the total wealth in the system).
For very wealthy investors W = O(1), this is not rigorously true because they in uence the market prices by their very bidding, Consequently, their motion is not a random walk and in practice we do nd a depletion of the immediate neighbourhood of the "upper cut-o " .
The dynamics of the very poor investors is also not represented faithfully by our macroscopic equations: around the poverty bound, the motion is dominated by the continuus pressure from the "subsidies".
These boundary e ects could in principle invalidate our simpli ed analysis and make it un t for the model in 9,10] (and/or other similar models). The t of our data of g 1 and 2 by the analysis below, can be taken as an "a posteriori" validation of the constant assumption as well as of the next assumption below.
-The rescaling of the relative individual wealths of the investors, produced by the change in the total wealth in the system. This can be represented by a shift in time of the distribution: (t + t; ln W ) = (t; ln W + t). Where is the factor necessary to rescale the wealth W of the individuals as to keep the total wealth in the system at time t + t equal to 1. All the individuals undergo this scaling except the ones which would cross the poverty line if submitted to the scaling. In a steady situation, we assume to be constant in time. In real runs the momentary value of results from the detailed microscopic dynamics of the model 9,10]. We will see however below that some information can be deduced based on macroscopic considerations.
Taking into account the 2 e ects above, the master equation away from the cut-o s is:
The stationary condition _ = 0 gives the equation:
It turns out that in the unbounded poverty case the solution which holds is (lnW) = 0 (4) and the ?1 power law described above holds:
in agreement with Figure 1 . It turns out that the solution of (3) tting the bounded poverty case P > 0 is the solution of the form (ln W ) e ? ln W (6) which as a distribution in W can be written:
where C is a normalization constant. We will see below that this solution reduces in practice to (5) in the limit that the poverty bound P is 0. Figure 2 depicts the steady state wealth distribution in a run of the microscopic model 9,10] with poverty bounded at P = 10 ?6 and N = 10 3 investors. In agreement with the macroscopic explanations leading to (7), the distribution obtained from the simulation of the microscopic model converges to a surprisingly precise power law which is preserved over the the entire wealth range except small neighbourhoods of the upper and lower cut-o .
This fact does not mean that the dynamics at the cut-o s is irrelevant. Quite contrary, it is it which through the details of the microscopic model 9,10] determines the actual values of the e ective "macroscopic" parameters and . Nevertheless, one can estimate roughly the exponent in (7) by using macroscopic phenomenological information available form the runs.
In our case we use the observation that there are essentially no investors owning more than 10 ?1 of the total wealth. This "upper-cut-o " e ect is due to the fact that the price of the equity rises each time an investor owning a signi cant share of the market (W > 10 ?1 ) bids for it. Reciprocally, the price of the equity decreases when he/she tries to sell it. Of course this is a non-universal e ect, related with the details of the microscopic model at the upper cut-o of the wealth distribution. However, we have found it is quite robust to changes in the microscopic dynamics. We are presently researching the extent of this robustness.
In order to use this phenomenological information to estimate macroscopically the exponent in (7) we write the 2 normalization equations:
-The integral of (W) for the e ectively allowed wealth interval must be equal to the total number of investors N :
-The integral for the same interval over the relative wealth of the investors is 1:
Using (7) in equation (8) one has:
CP ? N (10) while using (7) in equation (9) one has:
By eliminating C between (10) and (11) and recalling that P = 10 ?k and N = 10 n one gets: n ? 1 k ? 1 (12) which gives for the exponent of the power law in (7) the value ?1:4 for the values n = 3 and k = 6. This coarse estimation ts roughly the power extracted from gure 2 where the exponent is ?1:344 0:004. We assign the di erence between the 2 values to the fact that a signi cant fraction of the investors is trapped in the immediate neighbourhood of the "poverty line". This is e ectively decreasing the number of investors in the rest of the wealth range and consequently decreasing the slope .
We plan to study in further publications more precisely the universal properties of the dynamics as well as the dependence on the details of the microscopic model.
Summary
We nd a spontaneous emergence of a power law in the distribution of wealth among investors in a microscopic stock market model. Thus, in the long run steady state the wealth is divided very unevenly, and therefore a relatively small number of investors (the richest ones) become relevant for the long time dynamics.
This power law has implications for the size e ects of such stock market systems 11] and leads to market uctuations consistent with the experimentally found Levy distribution 5].
The self organized criticality in this model is explained by simple considerations of the dynamics. The two essential features of the model which give rise to the emergence of a power law are: a) The measured variable (wealth) is multiplied by a random variable in each time step. b) The multiplicative random variable is drawn from a distribution which is independent of the value of the measured variable.
We suggest that any system with the above two properties will end up with a power law distribution of the measured variable. For example, if one assumes that a city's population changes by a fraction of the population in each time period (a), and that this fraction is a random variable drawn from some xed distribution (b), then one obtains the power law distribution of city size as a natural consequence of the dynamics. It is our belief that reasoning of this nature can be extended to provide some insight into the appearance of self organized criticality in a variety of di erent systems.
When there are no limiting boundary conditions the exponent is expected to be -1.0. If a limiting boundary condition is present (for example, a city's population can not decrease below some lower limit) the dynamics leads to a critical exponent which is di erent from -1.0. 
